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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new formalization for the differential cryptanalysis of DES (Data Encryption Standard) based on 
Bayesian Networks (BN), an artificial intelligence framework used for reasoning on data affected by uncertainty. Through 
the proposed approach it is possible to analyze DES from a novel point of view, thus paving the way for the development 
of a new class of cryptanalysis methods. 
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1. Introduction 
The DES (Data Encryption Standard) is a symmetric cryptosystem standardized in the 70's for encrypting 
sensitive data. The research about DES led to the modern design of block ciphers and the design of several 
techniques for their cryptanalysis. Because of short size DES's key, the algorithm is today considered not 
adequate for critical applications. However more recent block ciphers, like the AES [1], have been designed 
to make infeasible a brute force attack. Nevertheless, since DES is still used for less sensitive data, and also as 
building block of Triple DES [2], it still very interesting to analyze its vulnerabilities. Several works in the 
scientific literature have identified and analyzed some of the mains vulnerabilities of the DES. These works 
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led to the development of new cryptanalysis techniques; among these, the most promising ones are linear 
cryptanalysis [3] and differential cryptanalysis [4]. Although these methods are extremely interesting from a 
theoretical point of view, because they contributed to identify serious vulnerabilities of DES, they are not 
usable in a real attack because of the huge amount of required encryption operations, even if it is less than a 
brute-force attack.  
This work proposes a feasibility study for the implementation of the differential cryptanalysis [4]. With 
respect to the classical approach used for the formalization of such technique, we propose the adoption of 
Bayesian Networks (BN), an artificial intelligence tool used for dealing with data affected by uncertainty. To 
the best of our knowledge this approach is a novelty in the scientific literature. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 recalls DES properties and discusses some related 
works; Section 3 describes the proposed Bayesian Network for modeling the attack to the S-Box, and then 
extends the proposed approach for attacking the whole DES; finally Section 4 states our conclusions and 
discusses some future works. 
2. DES description and related work 
DES is a symmetric cryptosystem that transforms a 64-bit plaintext P in a 64-bit ciphertext T. A 64-bit key 
K, actually reduced to a 56-bit key, since 8 bits are used as parity bits, parameterizes the transformation. DES 
acts on the plaintext P through a series of transformations named rounds. The input to each round is 
transformed through the application of the DES's Feistel function, which consists of a sequence of 
permutations and substitutions. A 48-bit subkey obtained from K using a scheduling algorithm for subkey 
generation parameterizes each round. Fig. 1(a) shows the general DES scheme, and Fig. 1(b) shows details of a 
single round processing. 
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 1. (a) DES general block scheme. (b) Block scheme of the DES’s round processing. (c) Detailed block diagram of the DES’s Feistel
Function. 
For each round X=2,…, 16, the following equations are valid: 
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namely, PX is obtained from PX-1 by replacing the left 32-bits half LX-1 of PX-1 with its right 32-bits half RX-1
and by replacing its right half with a nonlinear combination of LX-1 and RX-1, parameterized by the subkey SKX.
The core of a round is the Feistel function that contains the only non-linear component of DES, the S-Box.  
In particular, the mapping F, expanded in Fig. 1(c), is defined as follows: 
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where E is called expansion function, S is called S-Box, and P is called permutation. Appropriate tables 
detailed in [5] define such mappings. Domains and codomains of these functions are defined as follows: 
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It is worth noting that E and P are linear mappings, while S is the only nonlinear component of the 
algorithm; its goal is erasing the existing relations between the key SK and the plaintext. S-Box is the major 
security component of DES and their violation makes the whole encryption system easily violable. Generally, 
S-Box is not analyzed as a unique block, since it is composed by eight submaps 4
2
6
2: =o=iS , with i=1,…,8. 
Many works in the literature aim to analyze S-Box. Authors of [6] and [7] propose an analysis of S-Box 
properties and consequently some possible design criteria in block ciphers context. On the basis of the 
properties discovered, many cryptanalysis methods were proposed in the literature to violate the S-Boxes. An 
algebraic approach is proposed in [8], which defines the set of criteria for determining the set of non-linear 
algebraic constraints, which describes the I/O relationship of the S-Boxes. Exploiting this set of constraints, 
the whole cipher is described as a system of multivariate non-linear equations. On the contrary, the author of 
[3] proposes a linear approximation of S-boxes and of the whole DES, which is valid with some probability; 
such method is an example of stochastic attack on the S-Boxes. 
It has been shown that the distribution of the output of the S-Box is uniform if the input is unknown, but 
experimentally has been shown that the distribution of I/O differences is not uniform [4]. Taken two different 
inputs for a given S-Box and assuming that these two inputs are bounded by some known difference, then the 
probability distribution of the difference between the corresponding output of the S-Box is not uniform; such 
important property represents a strong system vulnerabilities, and underlies the differential cryptanalysis [4]. 
Authors trace differences through the transformations, discover where the cipher exhibits non-random 
behavior, and exploit such properties to recover the secret key. 
3. Bayesian networks for differential cryptanalysis  
The Bayesian Networks (BN) [9] are a formalism based on graph theory, expressing relationships of 
cause/effect among random variables. In the proposed approach we model the statistical distribution of I/O 
differences, discovered in [4], though a BN which allows performing a diagnostic inference to discover the 
key. The proposed BN, showed in Fig. 2(a), uses the original notation reported in [4]: at round X, SiEX, SiEX*
indicate the i-th block of six-bits of the output of the expansion function; SiKX is the i-th six-bits block of the 
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subkey; SiIX, SiIX* are two inputs to i-th S-Box; SiIX' is the XOR between S-Box inputs; while SiOX' is the XOR 
between S-Box outputs. 
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 2. (a) BN for the attack on the i-th S-Box. (b) BN for the attack on the i-th Feistel function. (c) BN for the attack on a 3-round DES. 
Since the differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack, it is possible to assume to know the 
following evidence: 
^ `''* ,,, OXIXEXEX SiSiSiSi 4 ,  (4) 
thus, searching the key is equivalent to maximize the following likelihood: 
).|( 4KXSip   (5) 
Through a diagnostic inference it is possible to evaluate the eq.5. When leading more than one attack, the 
whole distribution is proportional to the product of the single distributions; thus, given the following set of 
evidences 
^ ,`,,, 21 M444 < !   (6) 
the likelihood can be evaluated as follows: 
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Eq.7 can be solved through a differential approach. Let us define  
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^ ,`,,, 21 jj 444 < !   (8) 
then, it follows that  
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The probability density functions of the proposed BN, necessary to perform the probabilistic inference, are 
expressed as follows: 
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is the Kronecker delta and Si(.) is the i-th S-Box.
 
The proposed approach allows formalizing the attack to the whole Feistel function; nevertheless, since six-
bit blocks obtained as output of the expansion function are not independent, it is not possible to generalize the 
BN show in Fig. 2(a). An alternative BN, built following the same method, is shown in Fig. 2(b), which adopts 
the following notation: 
x *, XX ZZ : inputs to the Feistel function; 
x *' XXX ZZZ  : difference between inputs; 
x KXS : 48-bit subkey; 
x *, IXIX SS : inputs to the S-Box; 
'
XY : permutation of the difference between outputs from the S-Box. 
Attacking the Feistel function, in a chosen-plaintext context implies that it is possible to choose two inputs 
ZX and ZX*, exploiting which it is possible to compute the input XOR ZX’, and to observe the difference 
between outputs YX’. Through the diagnostic inference it is possible to reduce the uncertainty about the 48-bit 
subkey.
The BN can be used also for a forward inference process, which extracts samples from the implicit 
distribution of YX’ conditioned to ZX’. In particular, it is possible to sample YX’, starting from a 48-bit random 
number for SIX, obtained through a random number generator [9], and by applying the following equation:  
     .'' XIXIXX ZESSSSPY                      (11) 
The sampling technique can be used also for inferring the difference propagation inside the DES, while 
processing two input P and P*. Let P' = (L',R') be the XOR between inputs P and P*, explicitly decomposed 
in its left and right parts,  T' = (l',r') be the XOR of cipher output, ȜIX
 
be the XOR of inputs to the Feistel 
function at round X-th, ȜOX be the XOR of outputs from the Feistel function at round X-th. The propagation of 
differences can be modeled through a BN, as shown in Fig2(c) for a DES reduced to three round. 
In order to attack a N-round DES, it is necessary to adopt the following algorithm: 
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x Get the value ȜI(N-1) by sampling successive differences; 
x Get the value ȜIN=r’;
x Get the value  1'  NION l OO ;
x Build a subkey histogram by attacking the S-Boxes at last round using the BN in Fig. 2(a); 
x Once the last round is broken, proceed with the previous one.  
4. Conclusions and future work 
This work demonstrated that the differential cryptanalysis of DES can be implemented through an 
alternative and novel approach based on Bayesian Networks. The proposed approach models a BN for 
attacking a single S-Box, and it can be extended for attacking the Feistel function, and finally the whole DES. 
When analyzing the number of pairs <plaintext, ciphertext> required and the computational complexity, the 
proposed approach is equivalent to the original formulation.  Nevertheless the proposed novel point of view 
may pave the way for future promising developments. One of the most promising directions seems to be the 
exploitation of independences among different attack in a parallel implementation of the probabilistic 
inference. Moreover, it is possible to change the method adopted for the sampling phase, by performing an 
importance sampling that exploits the structure of the BN. Finally, we plan to evaluate alternative methods for 
performing efficient inference in Bayesian Networks, such as genetic algorithms [11], even in combination 
with parallelization [12]. 
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